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Abstract: When all else fails–justice, law, the institutional structure–solidarity is invoked as a 
fundamental principle in political discourse. Yet, such appeals to solidarity often determine 
radically divergent courses of action. This paper is animated by two intuitions: first, that 
solidarity cannot be divisive, as the ways in which it is invoked would suggest. Second, that 
solidarity does indeed lie at the foundation of our political relations, framing and supporting all 
else. The article attempts primarily to resist the conflation of solidarity with other concepts or 
from any normative antecedents. It will do so by targeting some central conceptions of 
solidarity available in the literature. Secondly, it will identify the paradigmatic locus of 
emergence of solidarity in the space left by the failure or limitations of institutions, while 
arguing that solidarity is not exhausted in these moments. Third, it will begin to articulate 
(rather tentatively, for the lack of space) a way of thinking about solidarity as a very basic 
relation that is political in a fully-fledged sense. It will also begin to explore the practical 
implications of this conception. My hope is that thinking of solidarity in the terms suggested 
here can frame actual solidarity practices as naturally as possible and be of some service to our 
political communities. 
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 2 
DOES SOLIDARITY NECESSARILY MOTIVATE ANTAGONISM? 
 
Appeals to solidarity abound in current political discourse and the contexts, in 
which solidarity is invoked, as well as the courses of action that claims to solidarity 
animate vary. Let me illustrate with two examples. 
 The financial-turned-fiscal crisis that hit various European countries, mainly in 
the South, from 2010 onwards triggered waves of popular movements towards 
these countries calling for the relaxation of the imposed austerity measures in the 
name of solidarity. Confusingly, however, creditor EU member states imposed 
austerity measures ostensibly on the basis of EU and domestic legislation again in 
the name of solidarity, this time as a foundational principle of the EU.  
 During the on-going Mediterranean refugee crisis that started in 2015 many 
European states declared their solidarity with people fleeing warzones and seeking 
safe harbour in Europe. On the part of European states, solidarity motivated 
closing down borders and ultimately a deal between the EU and Turkey for the 
return of migrants, a deal which, according to even the most generous analyses, 
endangered the very existence of migrants and refugees (indeed, the agreement 
very quickly proved even more unprincipled and fragile than critics initially 
thought). At the same time, it is also solidarity with refugees that motivated 
thousands of people in Greece and elsewhere actively to assist either by rescuing 
those at sea or by contributing to covering the refugees’ urgent needs for 
sustenance and basic hygiene and health care. Many, if not most, of those activists 
acted on the ideal of open borders and the sense that everyone, independently of 
citizenship, should enjoy at least some rights anywhere in the world coupled with 
the sense of responsibility of parts of the developed world for indirectly 
contributing to coercing, in a variety of ways, whole parts of populations to 
relocate in an attempt to survive. 
 It is often thought that such profound disagreements and radical discrepancies 
between courses of action ostensibly animated by solidarity do not only pertain to 
the conditions of application of principles of solidarity but rather to the nature of 
solidarity itself. Solidarity is thought to track its subjects and objects in a way that 
necessitates closure and therefore antagonism. This, however, runs contrary to the 
intuition that such profoundly inconsistent courses of action cannot all be 
determined by solidarity. This is not an arbitrary intuition; it has some grounding 
in political history as well as in a prima facie understanding of solidarity. From the 
very outset, solidarity was employed as a way of connecting different communities 
and people who might have had different commitments. Solidarity’s predecessor, 
fraternity, was precisely about resisting partisanship, transcending differences, and 
forging a post-revolutionary congruent community not of aim but of relative 
standing in conditions of liberty and equality.1 
                                                      
1 For an historical overview of the idea of solidarity, see Stjernø, Steinar (2010) Solidarity in Europe: 
The History of An Idea (Cambridge University Press). 
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 Nevertheless, let us take a closer look at this threshold question of whether 
solidarity necessarily leads groups barricading themselves around substantive 
commonalities. To do so, I will visit two helpful typologies of manifestations of 
solidarity, which suggest that solidarity is indeed exclusive. I assume that these 
taxonomies are meant as more than sociological archetypical categories or 
recordings of some social movements but rather as accounts of the nature of 
solidarity itself. 
 The first typology is offered by Kurt Bayertz.2 Bayertz distinguishes between 
two basic types of solidarity with the differentia specifica being the type of bond 
developing between the members of the solidarity group. On the one hand, there 
is agonistic solidarity, which can be defined as ‘the preparedness of an individual 
or a group to help another individual or group to pursue and assert their rights’3. 
On the other hand, we can speak of a more ethically demanding solidarity, which 
revolves around a tighter bond between the members of the community. The 
crucial difference between these manifestations of solidarity and other 
foundational normative concepts such as freedom, equality, and justice is that, 
unlike the latter, they are not neutral or universal; Bayertz believes that this type of 
solidarity presupposes ‘a partisanship carried by feelings of closeness’4. 
 Similarly, in Political Solidarity, one of the few book-length attempts at 
exploring the concept, Sally Scholz constructs three general types of solidarity5. 
Social solidarity is ‘a community relation that also entails some binding 
obligations’6. This type of solidarity is comprehensive and demanding. It 
establishes obligations on the part of participants in the group by virtue of their 
being members of the group. Civic solidarity is the type on which the 
postmetaphysical tradition in political philosophy relies. It pertains to ‘the 
obligations that the state as a collective has to each citizen; that is, by virtue of 
their membership in a political state, each citizen is obliged to all other citizens, 
and vice versa’7. Civic solidarity provides the justificatory bedrock for the welfare 
state as well as the diet of individual and mainly social rights established, primarily 
in Europe, from the 20th century onwards. Finally, political solidarity is the type 
exhibited by communities of aim, more specifically communities held together by 
the political struggle against injustice, oppression, tyranny, or social vulnerability. 
 With the exception of Scholz’s ‘civic solidarity’ (on a version of which more 
soon), all these types of solidarity are organised around reasons that apply to the 
members of solidarity associations. Nevertheless, although we get an account of 
the phenomenology and the entailments of these reasons, it is not clear at all what 
kinds of reasons they might be. 
                                                      
2 Bayertz, Kurt (1998) ‘Begriff und Problem der Solidarität’. In K.Bayertz (ed.), Solidarität: Begriff und 
Problem (Suhrkamp).Translations are by the author. 
3 Ibid at 49. 
4 Ibid at 49-50. 
5 Scholz, Sally (2008) Political Solidarity (Penn State University Press). 
6 Ibid at 21. 
7 Ibid at 27. 
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 One possibility is that they are agent-specific in the sense that they depend on 
each actor’s beliefs about which reasons apply to her. In this conception, members 
of the solidarity community share, or believe they share, certain beliefs, which 
motivate their action in a way that is consistent with the beliefs and actions of 
others. This is another way of describing a Durkheimian mechanical solidarity 
society, in which there is a generalised convergence of beliefs about how one 
ought to act in a community. But such a conception of solidarity might also be 
invoked by those who believe themselves to be acting on reasons, which (they 
believe) apply to others. This would be the case in what we might call triangular 
schemes of social relations (religious ones would be paradigmatic such schemes) in 
which one believes that there are compelling reasons stemming from outside the 
community itself to act towards others in a certain way whether others appreciate 
this and act accordingly or not. 
 The surprising upshot of this conception of solidarity, however, is that 
although living in a community in the flimsy sense that actions are necessarily 
other-directed is a necessary condition of solidarity, the community is not the source 
of reasons. Solidarity becomes entirely dependent on agents’ psychological 
attitudes, which are co-ordinated and stabilised either on the basis of expectations 
of reciprocity (as opposed to the institutional guarantees of reciprocity available in 
communities organised around institutional solidarity) or on the selfless and 
unconditional commitment of some members of the community to the welfare of 
others characteristic of religious conceptions of solidarity. This, however, flies in 
the face of every prima facie understanding of solidarity, an understanding which 
Bayertz and Scholz in fact share, according to which solidarity generates duties 
because one is a member of the solidarity community rather because of one’s opting 
in such communities. To put it slightly differently, this view is inconsistent with 
the intuition that solidarity constitutes and sustains communities rather than the 
other way around. 
 Even if one is reluctant to place weight on that intuition, or doesn’t share it, 
one will still have to see that in this picture solidarity loses its independent 
significance altogether. To work out how one in such social relations ought to act, 
all that we need to know are the reasons held by the person, whether her beliefs 
coincide with others’ or not. To dub these sets of reasons ‘solidarity’ is overkill. 
Unless, of course, the contention is that reasons of solidarity are substantive, 
universal, and agent-independent. In that case, however, the fragmentation of 
solidarity into various types becomes impossible. Solidarity will demand that one 
act in a specific manner at the exclusion of any other possible courses of action 
renders the offered typologies incoherent. 
 An alternative that would address the problem of side-lining the community 
and the corollary of prioritising the individual’s commitments and beliefs would be 
that solidarity reasons are belief-independent and stem from the community itself 
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(therefore not universal). Andrea Sangiovanni believes that such reasons are 
generated by collective agency in solidarity groups8. He suggests that acting in 
solidarity must meet certain conditions, which need not be known by the members 
of the solidarity group: that the members of the group share a goal and intend to 
make a contribution towards achieving it; that they are committed to the 
realisation of the shared goal by not by-passing each other’s will in the 
achievement of that goal; that they are disposed to incur significant costs to realise 
their goal and to share one another’s fates in ways relevant to the shared goal. 
 Sangiovanni attempts a number of things simultaneously: normatively to latch 
solidarity onto the community, that is on the fact of sharing certain goals rather 
than on the individual holding of the goals; to maintain a relative degree of 
pluralism (a pluralism of intentions and beliefs) within solidarity communities; 
while still depending the emergence of the solidarity community on the attitudes 
of the individuals comprising it rather than on something entirely alien to them 
such as the commands of a divine being. I am sceptical as to whether these aims 
are indeed achieved. 
 First, a question can be raised about whether a shared goal is required at all as 
a constitutive condition of solidarity associations. Solidarity typically surfaces in 
the form of demands to treat others in a certain way. Such demands can be 
intelligibly directed at those who do not share the goal. Consider the example of 
refugee rights activists and governments of the European Union member states. 
The two groups pursue different goals; the former work towards securing rights 
for refugees in the host countries whereas the latter work towards repatriation or 
at least expulsion from EU territory. Nevertheless, the demands raised by the 
former that the latter act on reasons of solidarity in order to secure refugee rights 
are perfectly appropriate in the sense that they refer to a common normative 
framework (the framework of solidarity) despite the divergence of the respective 
goals of the two groups. In other words, these demands are not calls to subscribe 
to a goal but to act on reasons of solidarity, which already apply to the demand’s 
addressees. 
 Secondly, it is questionable whether Sangiovanni’s conception of solidarity 
maintains pluralism within the same association. For principles of collective 
agency to be triggered, the group must have been already constituted on a 
different basis. Sangiovanni believes that he steers clear from reducing the 
constitutive condition of the group to participants’ evaluative attitudes 
distinguishing, to that end, between member’s individual intentions, on the one 
hand, and shared goals, on the other. It is the latter that constitute the group 
independently of the intentions, which might motivate each member to subscribe 
to the goal. 
 I doubt, however, that the distinction between intentions and goals is as sharp 
as Sangiovanni argues. Each participant’s second-order intention to pursue the 
shared goal as well as the way in which the goal is defined in the normative 
                                                      
8 Sangiovanni, Andrea (2015) ‘Solidarity as Joint Action’. Journal of Applied Philosophy, 32/4, 340-359. 
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scheme that determines her actions is always contingent on her first-order 
intentions. It follows that goals are never shared on the surface; they necessarily 
require an overlap between first-order intentions. Consider, for example, A and B 
who both aim at overthrowing dictator C. A wants to do so because she wants to 
establish a democratic regime and B because he wants to establish himself as a 
dictator. To say that A and B share the same goal despite their intentions would be 
completely to misread the parties’ dispositions as well as the relations between 
them. It follows then that solidarity is inevitably thick and determined by the 
shared commitments of the parties, which is what Sangiovanni wanted to avoid in 
the first place. One way around this would be to pitch the goals that the parties 
must pursue to increasingly higher levels of abstraction (e.g. to pursue ‘the good’ 
or ‘the right’) so as to iron out all possible disagreements and superimpose 
consistency of goal between various groups. This, however, would inevitably result 
in such lack of specificity as to make the shared goal requirement devoid of any 
content. 
 Nevertheless, let us entertain the idea that the democrat and the wannabe 
dictator really do share a goal and that solidarity really tracks that shared goal. 
Sooner or later the goal will be achieved or their opportunist association will fall 
apart under the weight of their deep disagreements. What, then, remains of 
solidarity? Is the link between refugees and those assisting them transformed into 
something qualitatively different? Or is it the case that, absent a common 
institutional framework, we revert to the state of nature and unrestrained conflict 
between parties which were until yesterday bound by the links of solidarity 
become permissible? Do those who sided with each other cease to owe any duty 
properly understood as a duty of solidarity once their goal has been achieved? 
 There is another pressing question opened up by reducing solidarity to shared 
goals. Does any shared goal do? On 13 November 2015, 130 people were left 
murdered or injured in a series of co-ordinated attacks by Islamist fundamentalists 
in Paris. Ten days later the then Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, David 
Cameron, visited Paris. In the joint press conference with the then President of 
the French Republic François Hollande, Cameron said the following: ‘It is clear 
that the world is coming together to tackle this evil terrorist threat. … We have 
shown our firm resolve and together we will destroy this evil threat’. And he 
added in French for added effect: ‘Nous sommes solidaires avec vous’. Cameron 
presents the problem clearly, if entirely inadvertently so. Can one declare solidarity 
with another in order to destroy?  
 Sangiovanni tries to address all these problems at one fell swoop by resorting 
to an external, universal, and unifying normative scheme. To that aim he 
introduces the distinction between reasons of solidarity, which are generated by the 
specific species of collective agency that I have been discussing so far, and reasons 
for solidarity, that is reasons that compel everyone to enter solidarity associations. 
Once again, for solidarity not to collapse into individuals’ moral preferences and 
for them to have some critical bite, these reasons must be agent-independent. 
  
Emmanuel Melissaris                   On Solidarity 
 
 7 
After rejecting reasons of shared experience and identity as inappropriate, 
Sangiovanni gives our moral obligation to join a solidarity association a broadly 
Kantian hue as a moral duty to exit the state of nature, establish just institutions, 
and avoid the alternative of civil dissolution. Again, however, there are significant 
problems. 
 First, this account of reasons for entering solidarity associations is too 
controversial and too determinate. It therefore unwarrantedly excludes various 
solidarity practices as unjustified or as an altogether different species of a practice. 
Does an anarchist, who is motivated not by the aim to establish just institutions 
but rather by a resistance to institutions, not act in solidarity for the right reasons? 
Or, if she does happen to act on reasons of solidarity, as singled out by 
Sangiovanni, is she simply morally lucky? Sangiovanni deals with this problem by 
shoehorning the concept of solidarity to specific aims that we want to achieve and 
therefore narrowing down the scope of his conception of solidarity: 
 
The aim of providing a philosophical analysis of the concept is to single out 
certain features that, I believe, best explain its characteristic role in political 
and theoretical debates centred on social justice, especially as regards the limits 
and aspirations of the welfare state. We therefore succeed in our endeavour if 
we can isolate a concept that brings out aspects of its general usage that are 
interesting and relevant for our guiding theme9. 
 
Sangiovanni admits that this will let many legitimate uses of the term solidarity fall 
through the cracks. The problem, however, is substantive, not semantic. Over-
circumscribing the reasons for entering solidarity associations already sets sharp 
boundaries between properly public/political and associational practices of 
solidarity from a vantage point outside the normative framework of solidarity 
itself. In other words, Sangiovanni set out to maintain pluralism but ends up 
suppressing it. 
 Secondly, and this reflects the problem that we encountered earlier, this 
picture fails to capture the manifestations of solidarity in the real world. Solidarity 
emerges most forcefully providing people with strong grounds for acting when 
institutions fail or prove incomplete and precisely because solidarity defies the 
pressures exercised by the systematicity of institutions, such as the principle of 
treating people alike and so on. Acts of solidarity are not only present but also 
perfectly justified in the exception without requiring an ultimate goal, from which 
to derive their value. Crucially, solidarity also generates justified claims against 
others even in the absence of the constitutive conditions of solidarity associations, 
which Sangiovanni singles out. Consider again the example of refugee rights 
activists, on the one hand, and European governments on the other. The claims 
that the former raise against the latter, their calls that governments act on grounds 
of solidarity, are not invitations or pleas to the individuals staffing European 
                                                      
9 Ibid at 343. 
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governments to act on right (Kantian) moral reasons but robust, enforceable 
political demands.  
 There is a second-order problem underlying the accounts of solidarity that I 
have discussed so far. They all presuppose a prior normative scheme that grounds 
solidarity and on which solidarity always depends. They therefore presuppose that 
the constitution of the community predates the normative scheme of solidarity. 
Sangiovanni’s distinction between reasons of and reasons for solidarity clearly 
illustrates this. What, then, might constitute the community? It must be either 
overlapping interests, desires, whims, or some compelling duty that is free from 
desire or whim. Sharing the distrust to humans that has guided much of liberal 
modern philosophy, Sangiovanni turns to Kant for assistance, where ‘Kant’ stands 
for morality as an order compelling us, even despite us. But it compels us as 
individuals; the duty is internal. Morality tells us: ‘do the right thing and associate 
with others, share the goal of bringing the rightful condition into being. Once you 
have agreed on these goals, you will have to treat each other in a specific way, you 
will have to live with each other in solidarity’. But why should this be so? There 
seems to be no space for solidarity in between the moral duty and overlapping 
motivations on one side of the historical divide and institutional duties on the 
other. Solidarity becomes surplus to requirements and can do no independent 
work in our political arrangements. Not only does this render the philosophical 
enquiry self-contradictory–one sets out to establish the independence of solidarity 
only to subordinate it to something we already know–but it also fails to measure 
up to our experience of the world. Solidarity does already do such work in our 
societies in a way that is always already fully political, in the sense that it grounds 
intelligible and justifiable claims and criticism even outside institutions. 
 
 
 
SOLIDARITY BEYOND, BUT NOT UNRELATED TO, 
INSTITUTIONS 
 
As I have already suggested, solidarity forcefully surfaces as the ground of justified 
claims, when institutions are either not in place at all or they are normatively and 
operationally insufficient. I have argued this largely by way of assertion so in this 
section I will pursue the point a little further. Identifying the paradigmatic locus of 
emergence of solidarity in the form of claims will also help us to come closer to 
working out solidarity’s nature. 
 Think back at our running examples. The austerity-driven suffering of the 
people of debt-ridden states was caused precisely because of the steadfast 
adherence to rules. Similarly, refugees, the sans papiers, economic migrants, and 
other third party nationals, do not enjoy full-blown (or, in some cases, any) 
membership of the political community so as to be entitled to be recipients of 
distributive justice. The care that is afforded to them by institutions is, first of all, 
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largely grounded in a promise exchanged between states–some, not all–in the form 
of international treaties. Such promises, like all promises, are always finite and 
always subject to change in light of actual circumstances. The promises exchanged 
here presuppose that the outsider is an exception and as such will not disrupt the 
political community that receives her. But the current refugee crisis is of such a 
scale that it threatens to disrupt this equilibrium. The utterly real-material walls 
erected by Balkan and Northern European countries, and the equally real but 
invisible normative wall erected by the European Union with its agreement with 
Turkey betray a fear not of the exception (exceptions pose little threat) but of the 
permanence, the entrenchment of a new situation as the reconfiguration of 
population and so forth. The promise of caring for outsiders meet its limits as 
soon as it becomes inconsistent with the identity, in which the promisor entered 
the promissory agreement in the first place. Appeals to solidarity therefore seem to 
try to pick up that which falls through the cracks of institutions. 
 Hauke Brunkhorst captures precisely this with his socio-theoretical account of 
the transformation of solidarity in modernity both in its earlier stages of functional 
differentiation as this took place within nation states and the later stage of 
globalisation10. Brunkhorst argues against the standard view that solidarity is either 
altogether non-political or at least juxtaposed to democracy qua majority rule. 
Indeed, he claims that solidarity is ‘one of the few concepts of moral thought that 
has proven to be fully compatible with the statist model of the political 
community’11. Solidarity, however, could not have survived modernity as the sense 
of communal togetherness or all-encompassing philia on the basis of a one-to-one 
recognition or the sharing of a common set of values. Modernity created two 
inclusion problems that differentiation, pluralism, and the decoupling of law from 
society, would not have allowed to be solved with resort to close, comprehensive 
ties. These two inclusion problems are the desocialisation of the individual (a 
necessary requirement of functional differentiation) and the proletarisation of 
society (a contingent consequence of differentiation)12.  
 
The two inclusion problems, that of individual exclusion and that of social 
exclusion, which broke out in early modernity and then in more acute form in 
the nineteenth-century religious civil wars and social-class struggles, were 
solved by the democratic constitutional state. … only the egalitarian, politically 
inclusive principle of democratic self-legislation, which could be effectively 
institutionalized in the course of the constitutional revolutions and class 
struggles of the eighteenth, nineteenth, and twentieth centuries in Western 
Europe and North America–and still chiefly there–first, produced a stable 
solution to the problem of pluralism, one that can be extended, achieve 
consensus, and is capable of learning and, second, led to the political 
                                                      
10 Brunkhorst, Hauke (2005) Solidarity: From Civic Friendship to Global Legal Community (MIT Press). 
11 Ibid at 5. 
12 Ibid at 92. 
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participation of ever wider segments of the population and thereby made the 
realization of democracy in terms of the welfare state into a permanent topic 
of politics13. 
 
The two inclusion problems, however, re-emerge in conditions of globalisation, 
because of the decoupling of law from politics and its subsequent coupling with 
the economy. Whereas economic rationality has transcended the boundaries of the 
nation state, the political has not or at least not to an extent sufficient to establish 
a strong public sphere, in which participation is not exhausted in consultation and 
opinion-giving but is also extended to cooperative decision-making. Brunkhorst 
argues that it is only the development of such a global public sphere that the 
inclusion problems of globalised late modernity will be addressed. 
 Importantly, he sees (writing in the early 2000s but the point is still relevant –
perhaps even more so – today) the emergence of such a global public sphere that 
could lead to the institutional instantiation of democratic solidarity largely as 
expressed in mass protest movements, which often transcend nation state 
boundaries.  
 
The second, quasi-constitutional criteria of legitimation of a social and political 
core of articulation and growing “protest avant-garde”, which arises from the 
varied forms of communicative execution of power, is its inclusive openness. … 
 
The legitimation of the new civil society culture of global opposition is weak, 
but not without verifiable criteria: “Voi G8, Noi 6,000,000,000” (You are G8, 
we are six billion). As long as the strong public-in-the-making must confine 
itself to the politics of the appeal, to “permanent arrest”, to “obstructing actual 
(and undemocratic) global power [Herrschaft],” the openness of the discussion, 
together with the sincerity of the engagement, is a necessary and sufficient 
criteria for speaking (in an advocatory way) even in the name of those who 
cannot or do not (yet) want to express themselves14.  
 
What I want to keep from Brunkhorst’s analysis for now is, first, that it provides 
support to what we have already tentatively seen in the running examples: 
solidarity surfaces in the form of claims that fall outside institutions, and this, I 
would suggest, might be manifested in conditions of globalisation (not least 
because globalisation presents a unique feature in that there is a complete absence 
of an institutionalised rightful condition), as Brunkhorst argues, but is not 
exhausted in that context. Secondly, despite the absence of institutions, solidarity 
claims are complete political claims. Seen from a different angle, solidarity is 
necessarily outward-looking in the sense that it pertains to a normative framework 
                                                      
13 Ibid at 99. 
14 Ibid at 159. 
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which stems from the community, i.e. is independent from the psychological 
attitudes of the community’s members, and normatively constitutes the 
community despite the lack of institutions allowing claims such as ‘we are six 
billion’. Belief-independence, however, does not imply agent-independence. The 
community generates the normative framework of solidarity because of its 
membership, though not because of some idealisation such as a shared goal. It is 
precisely this that allows the resocialisation, in the sense of repoliticisation, of the 
individual. 
 Might, however, solidarity as a political concept fully coincide with democracy 
as Brunkhorst seems to believe? If democracy is to be understood in the narrower 
sense of an institutionalised process of participatory decision-making, then the 
difference between it and solidarity becomes clear. Although democracy 
constitutes the political community and therefore shapes the bond between its 
members in a particular way, it cannot be the case that it introduces a bond 
between them out of nothing. It must supervene on some link between the 
participants in the democratically constituted body political, a link which will not 
be as thick as democracy but will not be normatively inert either. This is what 
allows appeals to solidarity to animate political action when democratic process 
proves to be incomplete. At the same time, appeals to solidarity are not 
antagonistic to democracy. When, for example, the demands for solidarity of the 
indignados in Spain, Greece, Portugal as well as those protesting in their support in 
Northern Europe during the pinnacle of the financial-turned-fiscal crisis, are not 
hostile to democratic process; far from it. But they are appeals that are sustained 
by something that pre-exists democratic process and is its necessary 
presupposition. Therefore, the new global civil society that Brunkhorst has in 
mind might be a precursor of a global democratic system but it is not a precursor 
of solidarity; it too rests on solidarity. 
 The same holds, if we think of democracy as wider than its institutional 
manifestations, namely as a strong public sphere, which might not have the 
authority or capacity to make and implement decisions but is at least a forum of 
operation of the political community. For this to be normatively possible, there 
must be some pre-existing link between the participants in the democratic public 
sphere.  
 This becomes strikingly evident in arguably the clearest context in which 
solidarity surfaces, protest or rebellion. In The Rebel Albert Camus says: ‘Man’s 
solidarity is founded upon rebellion, and rebellion can only be justified by this 
solidarity. We then have authority to say that any type of rebellion which claims 
the right to deny or destroy this solidarity simultaneously loses the right to be 
called rebellion and actually becomes an accomplice to murder’15.  
 ‘Je me révolte, donc nous sommes’, says Camus, but it is hard to tell whether 
for him solidarity performatively emerges in rebellion or whether rebellion is an 
                                                      
15 Camus, Albert (2013) The Rebel at 9 (Penguin Classics) (first published in France as L’Homme 
Révolté 1953). 
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affirmation of solidarity. Either way, this political, normative link between the 
rebels that we can call solidarity has no normative antecedent. The community of 
rebels is guided by solidarity (how else to hold one responsible for murder?) but, at 
the same time, it reconfigures itself in its specificity as a community of solidarity. 
We already precluded earlier the possibility of this coming down to the 
serendipitous convergence of personal preferences and the commitment to a 
shared goal. If this were the case, it would be impossible to speak of a community 
of rebels, which is normatively independent as a community but also pluralistic in 
terms of the beliefs of the participants in the community. Nor can it be the case 
that the criticism for transgressing the requirements of solidarity is criticism for 
failing to be guided by moral, i.e. pre-political, duties which are necessarily internal 
and non-enforceable. 
 For the community of solidarity to be re-specified through the suspension of 
institutions in rebellion, this pre-institutional, pre-contractual, yet fully political 
bond must have some content. It must be such as to allow for the reconstitution of 
the community.  
 One might think that that content is determined historically. Some years after 
Camus and at a time of proliferation of movements of civil disobedience in the 
U.S.A., Hannah Arendt16 made much of de Tocqueville’s consensus universalis, which 
is always prior to and presupposed by the exchange of promises forming the social 
contract and to which the parties to the contract can always revert when the 
coincidence between real circumstances and mutual promises wears thin. 
Disobedience (always conscientious and always nonviolent), Arendt believed, was 
justified because it reaffirmed the Montesqieuean “spirit” of American laws, the 
consent qua active participation, which was inescapably accompanied by the 
possibility of dissent. Note: the spirit of American laws, not the spirit of a yet 
unconstituted community. If this is the case, however, we shall never be able to 
say “voi G8, Noi 6,000,000,000” nor will we be able to act in solidarity with 
refugees in the cracks of institutions that we have opened wider with acts of 
disobedience. This is not because we will not have in fact come together (after all, 
how can 6 billion of us come together?) but because even if we do come together 
we shall not be normatively able to act in a way that isn’t at the same time an 
instance of violence. Immigrants, refugees, are not part of the consensus universalis, 
the spirit of “our” laws does not extend to them. With solidarity becoming inert, 
acts of assisting refugees become acts of charity. Charity, however, is necessarily 
an unequal relationship. The charitable person always has something that the 
object of his charity does not have and is not entitled to. Neither is this what those 
acting on solidarity towards immigrants claim (or at least some of them) nor is it 
the reading that best coheres with our intuitions about our relationships to those 
who are washed out on our shores. 
                                                      
16 Arendt, Hannah (1972) Civil Disobedience. In Arendt H. Crises of the Republic (Harcourt Brace) 
(first published in the New Yorker, September 12 issue, 1970). 
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 If we are to make sense of solidarity, we do need to leave institutions but we 
need something more basic that underpins all institutions and not only something 
necessarily bound to its context.  
 
 
 
A MORE BASIC CONCEPTION OF SOLIDARITY 
 
This is where we are at: it is a mistake to subject solidarity to beliefs about reasons 
that one may hold for acting because then solidarity duties are misread as 
stemming from the agent exclusively rather than from the agent’s membership of 
a community. This would also misread an opt-out clause in each and every 
solidarity duty. However, thinking of solidarity as community-related should not 
be conflated with accepting that solidarity depends on the constitutive conditions 
of the community or on anything else that is normatively antecedent. If that were 
the case, solidarity would already lose its independent significance. Finally, we have 
seen that a central locus of manifestation of solidarity in the form of intelligible 
and justified political claims against others in the absence of an institutional 
structure, in conditions of globalisation or protest, disobedience, rebellion.  We are 
therefore looking for a conception of solidarity that is basic and fully political.  
 David Wiggins thinks of solidarity as the very root of the ethical in terms of a 
basic mutual recognition, which generates at least some negative duties towards 
each other. He arrives at this by combining Hume’s contention that we are 
motivated by self-love and benevolence  
 
to promote the benevolence of each and everyone else; and each and everyone 
seeks constantly to diminish each and everyone else’s private concern to 
attend only to self-love. In succession to this interplay, the words “useful”, 
“useless”, “good”, “bad”, “fair”, “foul”, “ugly” and “beautiful” ... take on a 
public and shareable significance which comes to transcend any particular 
person’s private and particular situation17.   
 
Promising as a starting point as he may find this, Wiggins singles out some 
important deficiencies. First, Hume does not account for the pre-reflective mutual 
recognition of humans. Second, it identifies the proto-ethical in terms of the 
interplay of self-love and benevolence cannot account for ‘primitively prohibitive 
aversions’ which we display in the face of the slaughter of innocents. Third, Hume 
‘has too little sense of what the generalization of benevolence in “public spirit and 
other social virtues of that stamp” may find itself licensed to award to “winners”, 
or what it will be licensed to take away from “losers”, in deliberations directed 
towards the greater happiness’18. 
                                                      
17 Wiggins, David (2008) ‘Solidarity and the Root of the Ethical’, The Lindley Lecture, at 7. 
18 Ibid at 8. 
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 These deficiencies, Wiggins believes, can be addressed with reference to 
something like the morality of the encounter, which he draws from Simone Weil, 
whom it is worth quoting at length: 
 
Anybody who is in our vicinity exercises a certain power over us by his very 
presence, and a power that belongs to him alone, that is, the power of halting, 
repressing, modifying each movement that our body sketches out. If we step 
aside for a passer-by on the road, it is not the same thing as stepping aside to 
avoid a billboard; alone in our rooms, we get up, walk about, sit down again 
quite differently from the way we do when we have a visitor. But this 
indefinable influence that the presence of another human being has on us is 
not exercised by men whom a moment of impatience can deprive of life, who 
can die before even thought has a chance to pass sentence on them. who can 
die before even thought has a chance to pass sentence on them. In their 
presence, people move about as if they were not there19. 
 
These are the building blocks –and they are important ones. A minimum upshot 
of this ‘indescribable influence’ which does not collapse into Humean 
benevolence, but is co-extant with it, is the prohibition of causing harm to others. 
 Wiggins is right to argue that ‘human solidarity is a way of being, not a way of 
arriving at something else’20. However, a clearer demarcation needs to be drawn 
between solidarity as motivation and solidarity as a source of ethical/political 
duties. 
 A first concern is that Wiggins’ conception of solidarity presupposes an 
idealisation of the person as an agent effortlessly able to overcome the externally 
driven interpellation both of herself and others. The encounter, however, is never 
unmediated and the influence exercised by each of us on each other is not quite 
indescribable. Indeed, in the course of the encounter the other is realised in such a 
way that the reduction and idealisation that distance makes possible disappear and 
perceived differences become palpable. Take the example of the refugees again. 
While the innocent victims of a savage civil war in Syria are contained within Syria, 
they only bear the characteristics that we impute to them from the humanitarian 
comfort of our living rooms. But no sooner do we encounter them at our borders 
or the streets of our cities that they re-acquire all those characteristics that many 
think separate us from them. They are impoverished, they espouse a different 
religion, their skins have a different complexion. Solidarity as recognition fails to 
extend to the bearers of such characteristics making it possible for walls to be 
erected very much in the name of recognition as rejection.  
                                                      
19 Weil, Simone (1965) ‘The Iliad, or the Poem of the Force’ (Mary McCarthy transl.). Chicago Review 
18/2, 5-30, at 9 (first published in French as ‘L'Iliade ou le poème de la force’ in Les Cahiers du Sud 
1941). 
20 Wiggins, n 17, at 18. 
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 Or consider the example of violent confrontation, which concerns Weil in the 
first place in the passage on which Wiggins relies so heavily. Those who are on 
their knees, Weil tells us, do not exercise this indefinable influence. They 
themselves ‘imitate nothingness’ so as not to risk being destroyed by those at 
whose mercy they find themselves. One might be committing a moral wrong, if 
one strikes the person on his knees but will that be a wrong against solidarity? 
 The emphasis on the encounter generates, perhaps paradoxically, also the 
opposite problem. Those whom we do not encounter and are never likely to 
encounter might still be affected by our actions and yet their ‘indescribable 
influence’ that Weil speaks of will never be exerted on us. 
 I also worry that idealising the agent living in solidarity in that way risks 
allowing altogether to neglect the non-human environment. Doing so would be a 
mistake on a number of levels. The non-human environment is, first of all, 
epistemically central; we cannot know each other but as parts of that environment. 
Secondly, it is normatively important. Our actions are transmitted through the 
non-human environment for them to make an impact on the real and normative 
standing of others. 
 Although Wiggins is right that the epistemic and the normative are intimately 
linked, it is important not to conflate the latter into the former and to dissociate 
the gaze of the actual, flesh and bones individual from what lies at the foundation 
of solidarity; something that is both non-actual (at least not necessarily so) and 
inescapable. 
 
 
 
ΑΛΛΗΛΕΓΓΥΗ/ALLILENGÍI – BEING IN ONE LIMB 
 
Much of the literature on solidarity as well as much of its everyday employment 
draws on the Roman legal institution, to which solidarity is ostensibly 
genealogically traced back. In Roman law to be liable or to have an entitlement in 
solidum (the institution has survived in many contemporary legal systems) was to be 
liable for the entire debt owed by a group, should other members of the group fail 
to repay it, and to be entitled to claim the full amount on behalf of the rest of the 
creditors. In this picture solidarity is derivative of a pre-existing relationship, which 
comes about either by promising or entirely involuntarily. It is that relationship 
that makes responsibility possible. I have already called into question whether this 
is the order of things – whether solidarity is determined by some other 
relationship.21 This also amounts to calling into question whether solidarity is only a 
relationship of responsibility, if by responsibility we mean accountability for one’s 
failure to discharge a duty as is the case in in solidum obligations. Although 
                                                      
21 Avery Kolers questions the subordination of solidarity to something antecedent too. However, he 
arrives at a different conclusion as to what solidarity consists of, namely acting equitably on others’ 
terms. Kolers, Avery (2016) A Moral Theory of Solidarity (Oxford University Press). As I have already 
argued, such conceptions of solidarity disregard that it stems from being in community with others.  
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responsibility will inevitably be part of what it means to be in a relation of 
solidarity with others, these two do not collapse into each other. Solidarity is what 
generates the duties in the first place. 
 The Greek sense of solidarity alludes to a different sense of solidity. 
Αλληλεγγύη – allilengíi – connotes being in one limb or one body.22 There is 
clearly a danger in making too much of this merging of the parts into a whole. It 
would be an error to collapse the individual into the collective against our better 
judgement and experience of the self, which indicate that the individual enjoys 
epistemic, at the very least, priority. It would also be an error to reduce solidarity 
to a strength-in-numbers type of claim about the efficiency of collective action. 
Not only would these be philosophical mistakes but they would also misinterpret 
the sense of mutuality in allilengíi, which is not a quid pro quo reciprocity or 
reciprocity as a pre-agreed term. How then to make sense of αλληλεγγύη?  
 We should go back to the very conditions of acting in the world. We tend to 
think of action as unidirectional and oppositional: we act and the world is the 
object of our action. Since in this view we are placed outside the world, we are also 
placed apart from others. When we bring about change in the world, we do so in a 
way that impacts on the lives of others and determines them accordingly. Each 
action is therefore either an exchange or a threat. 
 But what if we redraw this picture so as to think of acting as multi-directional 
and always co-operative without artificially collapsing the one into the whole? 
 Enter AJ Julius, who thinks of solidarity, coupled with freedom and equality, 
in terms of our knowing each other’s activity figures in the activity itself.  
 
You don’t just know yourself to be doing, experiencing, thinking what you do, 
experience, think; you don’t just see your life as constituted by these events 
and by the first-personal awareness of them that you enjoy as their subject. 
You can also rely on me to know what you’re up to and what you’re like. It 
might be that it’s a good way for your life to go that I know how you’re living 
it; to do or think what I can know you to do or think is to act or think in one 
way well. Suppose that’s so. Then my knowing how the activity figures in your 
life can include my knowledge that in known by me it helps to constitute your 
living well. So I have available to me a first-personal representation of my 
knowledge of your activity as forming a valuable part of your life and so as 
forming a valuable part of my life. Since your activity’s place in your life forms 
part of a first-personal representation of its place in my life, I can regard it as 
part of my life. I can know myself to be succeeding partly through your doing 
things that I know you to be doing and that I know to play a part in your life 
through my knowing them. I can take your activity to be a part of my life 
                                                      
22 This is not meant as an exercise in semantics. The word prompts us to think about the substance 
in an alternative way. 
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through my knowledge of it if and because I can trust that my knowledge of it 
as contributing to your life figures in its contribution to your life23. 
 
Through this intersection of our knowledge of each other’s activity, each action of 
each individual–who, note, remains an individual–in an important, though not 
complete, sense, becomes the action of each other individual. 
 This makes significant progress towards thinking of acting as always acting in 
solidarity. There is, however, a remainder. First, have we already managed to think 
of solidarity as αλληλεγγύη, and action as action in one body? Second, have we done 
away with the need of the encounter with all the limitations, which we identified 
earlier? 
 To be in solidarity by being in one limb, we need to consider that to act in the 
world is much more than to change the representation of the world in ideas; it is 
also to bring about change in the very real constitution of ourselves and our 
environment and the relations between us and our environment. On one level, this 
mutual constitution has to do with the roles which have been ascribed to us, in 
one way or another, by normative schemes; the normative unit of the family, the 
law, and so forth. But there is also a level, which is often neglected by much of 
contemporary political philosophy, and this is the utterly material, unmediated way 
in which we live in the world. When acting, we take the world as has already been 
formed by the actions of others. This creative input does not expire once it has 
been completed; it is always there as part of the world. Our actions, as well as the 
actual transformation that we bring about in the world, therefore, never come 
afresh, they are always an enrichment of what already incorporates the actions of 
others. To put it more simply, action is always change and never creation. Our 
steps are always imprinted on the steps of others and then they are merged; our 
actions figure in the lives of others not only as knowledge or representation. We, 
as a material part of action, are always locked in these material relations with 
others who have trodden where we tread. 
 Humans also have the, possibly unique, ability to not only be part of the 
action but also to think of it as their action. This fact of consciousness has led 
many to separate between us and our actions and consequently to draw sharp lines 
between acts as agents/actors. If we pull back and think of ourselves as part of the 
action and as part of the world, we will see that our consciousness can only be 
locked with the consciousness of others in activity that is always cooperative. 
 This already puts the question of the encounter in a different light. Neither is 
Wiggins’ encounter nor is the knowledge of how our knowledge of specific others’ 
activity as forming a valuable part of their life adds value to our lives, to slightly 
paraphrase Julius, the source of solidarity. These might be impressions on our 
consciousness of the consciousness of others but solidarity kicks in long before 
that. Solidarity’s source is the impossibility of acting in the world without this 
                                                      
23 Julius, AJ (2016) ‘The Jurisprudence Annual Lecture 2016 – Mutual Recognition’. Jurisprudence: An 
International Journal of Legal and Political Thought 7:2, 93-209, at 208. 
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action being part of the action-change that others have brought about in the world 
and the fact that no sooner do we form consciousness of action that we join 
others in cooperation as actors that lends solidarity its normative force.  
 To act in the world, to interact with it in space and time, is to be in it as its 
part. There is no one of whom this cannot be said as a matter of necessity. 
Therefore, acting in the world is to be part of others’ actions and others are always 
part of your actions. Put in the language of solidarity, when acting in the world, we 
always act in one limb. To deny solidarity as αλληλεγγύη to others is to contradict 
oneself. Since solidarity is such a very basic interdependence, it also emerges as the 
basic guide of action. Precisely because it does not require an encounter but 
frames every possible encounter, solidarity is political in the most complete sense, 
the modern sense of a normative link between strangers occupying the same space 
and time and being increasingly materially interconnected. 
 All I hope might have been achieved now is to garner enough intuitive 
support for the idea of solidarity as interdependence primarily through our 
constitution as material beings interacting with the world in material ways and 
becoming parts of it; secondarily, through our consciousness as the kind of being 
that can reflect and make something–something further–of its interactions with its 
environment. In a sense, we have snatched solidarity from the hands of Kant and 
trusted it with revolutionaries who only have each other to rely on. In another 
sense, we have returned solidarity to Marx. But the more important question now 
is practical. How does solidarity as αλληλεγγύη, as basic interdependence, guide our 
action-in-common? I can only begin to sketch an answer to this in what follows. 
 
 
 
WHAT IT MEANS TO ACT IN SOLIDARITY 
 
Camus helped us to see earlier that the community of solidarity–there a 
community of rebels finding themselves in the suspension of institutions that is an 
affirmation of living–constantly reconfigures itself through its interactions. It is in 
this process that specific duties and demands will emerge and develop. It is 
therefore impossible to determine in abstracto, from the perspective of the 
philosopher how a community of solidarity that is contained in space will govern 
itself. 
 Solidarity, however, sets the framework. There are certain things that 
necessarily flow from its nature and these we can sketch (and it is only a sketch 
that I can attempt here) from the philosophical standpoint. 
 First, a general prohibitive duty, one that Wiggins extracts too, flows from this 
conception of solidarity. This is the duty not to destroy. To transform the world is 
both inescapable and, within limits set by solidarity itself, permissible. But to 
destroy altogether either others or the physical environment in which we act is at 
one and the same time an act of self-destruction. It is a radical, irreversible 
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impoverishment of our lives both in a backward- and forward-looking way. It 
destroys our imprint in the world and it also destroys the scope of our acting in 
the future, therefore the scope of our being, in the world. To the extent that self-
destruction is self-contradictory and therefore irrational, unjustifiable, and 
impermissible (this we will have to assume as being the case for now), destruction 
of others is also self-contradictory, irrational, unjustifiable, and impermissible.  
 But there is more to solidarity than this basic negative duty. Recall that, when 
discussing the potential in the mobilisation of global civil society, Brunkhorst 
spoke of solidarity in terms of inclusive openness. What exactly does this mean and 
why does it flow from solidarity? 
 In one sense, openness is inescapable. If we are part of our action and if our 
action is part of a whole that cannot be broken down to its constituent parts, then 
nothing we ever do can be owned by us. However, the important sense of 
openness is played out on the level of consciousness. We are aware that acting in 
the world always has an impact but we are hardly ever fully aware of the extent of 
impact (often we do not even know what exactly it might be) or the identity of 
those who might be directly affected by our actions. Destruction is always a risk in 
acting. If destruction of others is also an instance of self-destruction, then we have 
good reason to make sure that our actions will not be destructive. This necessitates 
inviting everyone who might be affected by our actions to act in unison with us 
but also to form awareness of the action. Now, this is incredibly demanding and it 
would be foolish to suggest that such a constant interconnection is possible or 
desirable. This, however, can be addressed with the right division of work towards 
the aim of realising the interdependence that is solidarity, the correct balance 
between care, institutional arrangements, and responsibility-ascription. What is 
important is that the invitation always remains open and is never exhausted in the 
institutionalisation of our mutual promises to act in a non-destructive way. This is 
why solidarity can always be invoked at the cracks of institutions and can sustain 
communities of rebellion. 
 Openness is determined by the scope of the ethical relationship that is 
solidarity across persons/actors. Inclusiveness refers to the scope of solidarity in 
relation to each person/actor. Openness grants everyone admission to the 
community of solidarity. Inclusiveness determines how one is granted admission. 
Every member of the solidarity community, in other words everyone, is a fully 
developed, multi-faceted agents and parts of the practical world of action precisely 
because of the irreducibility of the material world to any of its parts.  
 There is an obvious asymmetry between this very demanding requirement of 
inclusiveness and our ability to access our environment through our 
consciousness. Much as we may try, we cannot know the world in its totality. We 
are therefore bound to make sense of the world and others in snapshots 
determined by the context in which our interaction is played out. 
 This asymmetry is exacerbated even more when the context of interaction is 
institutional. If there is one thing that can be said about modern law with certainty 
is that it inevitably governs us in a compartmentalised and compartmentalising 
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way. We are subjects of the criminal law, the law of tort, inheritance law, but, 
coherent as a legal system may try to be, it is impossible for modern law to treat us 
as the all-encompassing agents that solidarity requires. This brings back to the fore 
the scepticism that I expressed regarding the conflation of solidarity with 
democracy. No sooner does democracy become an institutionalised procedure of 
regulating participation and common decision-making that the distance is created 
between the normative demands of solidarity and those of democracy. 
 How, then, can we reconcile solidarity with institutionalisation, assuming that 
modern complexity makes institutionalisation inevitable? 
 There is no perfect way; there will always be a remainder. But there are small 
things to hang on to. 
 First, we must realise that solidarity is always there animating and making 
possible an institutional structure. This does not leave institutions unaffected. An 
important ramification of this is that the institutional structure must be directed 
towards reflecting the normative interrelations of solidarity. This might entail a 
number of things with the following two being quite central to it. First, it 
undercuts the exceptionalism that has become typical of different areas of law. 
Take the criminal law. With solidarity in the background, criminal responsibility 
cannot be conceived independently from the ways, in which the rest of the 
institutional structure has determined the (institutional) normative position of the 
member of the solidary community (now reconfigured as a political, legally 
constituted community). [One might think: how can responsibility be attributed at 
all? If we are all connected in such an intimate manner, how can anyone’s actions 
be singled out so as to hold one accountable? The answer is too complex to work 
out here. All that can be said is that, although the conditions of responsibility will 
indeed have to be rethought and adjusted to solidarity as the political normative 
order setting the background to our institutions, responsibility itself does not 
become obsolete. We tend to regard holding one accountable as a response to an 
infraction and therefore as an instance of exclusion. Solidarity, however, forces us 
to see it as a continuation of ethical/political life. To ascribe responsibility is yet 
another way of including the other]. 
 Secondly, solidarity operates as a regulative ideal so as to set the aim of the 
institutional structure at achieving the kind of equality that solidarity entails. This 
is where we encounter perhaps the biggest challenge with employing solidarity as a 
practical, political concept. Although solidarity animates all political action, 
political action–and especially institutionalised action–can never duplicate the 
conditions of solidarity. A paradox thus emerges (a paradox that haunts all 
regulative ideals), perhaps a tragic one. One is guided by something that one can 
never achieve. Unlike charity, which is exhausted in the charitable action, solidarity 
always demands more. Consider again the solidary rebel. The demands of rebellion 
are the conditions of its own disappearance (although solidarity as a justificatory 
condition of rebellion is always in the background). As soon as the rebel’s 
demands are satisfied, the rebel becomes a conformist (‘It is well known that the 
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most radical revolutionary will become a conservative on the day after the 
revolution’, Arendt says). The rebel wants to be a rebel and, at the same time, 
wants to stop being so. (It is therefore somewhat strange and unexpected of 
Arendt to call for the institutionalisation of disobedience; this would mark a 
victory and a defeat at one and the same time). 
 Tragedy and paradox can never motivate. Even if we agree that solidarity is 
inescapable and independent from our dispositions as a source of reasons for 
acting in a certain way, this does not mean that it can also motivate. Does it 
therefore follow that solidarity is debilitating rather than liberating? Can it make 
any difference to our practical deliberations in a non-coercive way?  
 Although the paradox cannot be resolved (isn’t that part of the nature of 
paradoxes?), it might be tempered. There is a knowledge that we can all acquire 
and which would have been impossible without realising the idea of solidarity. 
First, that solidarity necessarily frames all our actions in the world; second; that 
this is not unique to any one community of people but is, rather, universal; third, 
that acting in solidarity will bring us one step closer to emancipation and allow us 
to live our finite lives as happily as possible despite our vulnerabilities. This 
knowledge might motivate us because there is little else that we can do to tread on 
the earth together in as fulfilling way as possible. 
 
 
